Tax policy options to promote private capital formation in Pakistan by Feltenstein, Andrew & Shah, Anwar














In Pakistan, at least, changes in corporate tax rates are probably
better instruments  for promoting capital  formation  than  are
increased investment tax credits. Increasing the investment tax
credit stimulates more capital formation than does decreasing
corporate taxes, but the tax credits also increase inflation.
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References  26GFNERAL EQUILIBRIUM  EFFECTS OF TAXATION ON INVESTMENT IN A DEVELOPING
COUNTRY:  THE CASE OF PAKISTAN
Andrew Feltenstein and Anwar Shah*
I. Introduction
Tax incentives  are frequently employed by developing nations to stimulate private investment
and foster economic growth.  The impact of such policies in meeting stated policy objectives in
developing countries has received serious research attention only in recent years.  Recent attempts
to quantify these impacts, while credible, are set exclusively  in a partial equilibrium framework 'see
Shah and Baffes (1990), Bernstein and Shah (1991a, 1991b,  1991c),  and Rajagopal and Shah (1990a,
1990b) for application of dynamic duality to this question).  Analysis of such policies in a partial
equilibrium framework are woefully inadequate as these do not capture the intersectoral impacts of
such policies. A partial equilibrium framework is not able to capture complex interactions among
various sectors of  the  economy and  other  taxes in  the  economy.  A  large majority of  these
interactions are simply assumed away in such analyses. In addition, these analyses usually do not
consider the interaction between tax credits and the government budget deficit and therefore cannot
evaluate possible financial crowding out that may be brought about by the interest rate implications
of increased budget deficits. If these interest rate implications  are sufficiently  strong, their negativ  e
impact on investment may  outweigh the positive effects of the tax credits on private investment (see
Pereira (1990) and Feltenstein and Morris, (1990)).
An applied general equilibrium model can provide a disaggregated  view of the economy and
thereby yield quJantitative  estimates of all important interactions. It thus appears to be a more
* This is one of a series of discussion papers prepared for the World Bank research project, "An
Evaluation of Tax Incentives For Industrial and Technological  Development".  The project is directed
by Anwar Shah of the Public Economics Division.  The authors are grateful to Bela Balassa and
Tercan Baysan for comments.valuable tool for assessing the  relative merits of alternative incentives policies.  (For developed
co-  , uy  applications using general eAuilbrium  analysis  see e.g. Hamilton, Shah and Whalley (1985),
Goulder and Summers (1989), Sen and Turnovsky (1990)). This paper specifies a dynamic general
equilibrium  framework to evaluate the cost effectiveness  of incentives  for industrial and technological
develooment offered through the tax code in Pakistan.  The applied dynamic general equilibrium
model employed in this paper enables us to estimate adjustment effects on factor use and output with
a tax incentive policy  change. Detailed calculations  are presented showing percent change in output,
use of capital by sector, changes in tax rever.-~ paid by each sector and impacts on macroeconomic
aggretates. Welfare gains and losses of urbai  and rural consumers associated with proposed policy
changes are also estimated.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section II provides a summary view of
the corporate  tax regime and investment incentives in Pakistan.  Section III outlines the .nodel
structure  and  details  procedures used  in  evaluating policy changes.  Section IV  presents  the
benchmark simulation for Pakistan. Section V carries out policy  simulations  of aLernative incentives
strategies.  Finally, Section VI discusses overall conclusions of  this paper and  also draws policy
implications.
The paper concludes that the investment tax credit offers a greater degree of investment
stimulation than an equal yield corporate tax rate reduction.  Aggregate welfare, however, is higher
under a tax rate reduction alternative. Thus from aggregate consumer welfare viewpoint, corporate
tax rate reduction appears to be a superior policy  alternative in Pakistan.
II.  Corporate Tax Incentives In Pakistan
Pakistan has followed a stable coporate tax rate regime since the early 1960s. Corporate
income tax rate at 30% and a super tax at 25% have been maintained consistently  during the iast two
2decades. Only in the fiscal  year 1989-90,  was the super tax rate brouirnt  down to 15%. Foreign
direct investment  receives  tax treatment  equivalent  to domestic  investment. Losses  are allowed  to
be canied forwar, six years  but no carryback  of such losses  is permitted. A sales tax at 12-.5%  is
payable  on all domestically  manufactured  goods by the producer and on imported goods by the
importer.  Currently (1989-90),  import duties at differential rates are  imposed on  imported
machninery  and equipment.  These rates vary from 20 to  50%  if  similar machinery  is not
manufactured  in Pakistan and a higher rate of 86% applies  to imported  machinery  with domestic
substitutes. Businesses  are further subject  to a large number of miscellaneous  licensing  fees and
charges.
The regime  of fiscal  incentives  through  the corporate  income  tax has experienced  significant
changes  over time.  From time to time, Pakistan  has relied upon a variety  of fiscal  incentives  to
stimulate  investment.  These include  accelerated  capital  consumptior  allowances  for certain  physical
assets,  full  expensing  for R&D investments,  tax  rebates,  regional  and  industry  specific  tax holidays  and
investment  tax credits. These are briefly  discussed  below:
Tax Holidays:  Tax  holidays  for two  years  for specific  industries  (e.g.  engineerinj  Is)  and
specific  regions (most  of the country  except  major metropolitan  areas) was introduced  in 1959-60.
The holiday  period was subsequently  raised to four years in 1960-61. These tax holidays  were
eliminated  in 1972-73  but reinstated again in 1974-75. Presently  tax holidays  for five years are
permitted to  engineering  goods, poultry farming and processing,  dairy farming,  cattle or sheep
breeding,  fis!h  farming,  date processing  and manufature  of agricultural  machinery  industries  and also
to all industries  in designated  areas  of the country.
Investment  tax credits:  Industries  are eligible  for varying  tax credits  according  to location. A
general tax credit for modernization  and replacement  of plant and equipment  was introduced  in
1974/75  at 15%  rate but its application  was restricted  to designated  areas. Since  1976-77,  the credit
3was made available regardless  of location and type of industry. This credit was withdrawn in 1989-90
and reiust.  _d in 1990-91.
Tax rebates:  Companies exporting goods manufactured in Pakistan are entitled to a rebate
of 5S  of taxes attributable to such sales.
Accelerated  Capital  Consumption  Allowances: Capital  consumption  allowances follow
accelerated schedules for machinery and equipment, transport vehicles and housing f'or workers
(25%), oil exploration equipment  (100%), ship building (20-30%), and structures (1"  -)  on  a
declining balance  method.  Expenditures  relating to  research  and  development, transfer  and
adaptation of technologies and royalties are eligible for full expensing.
Of the incentives numerated earlier, only the two general incentives,  namely, investment tax
credit for physical investment and a corporate tax rate reductions are the subjects of investigation in
this paper.  Since these twvo  types of incentives are widely used in both  the developed and the
developing worlds, an evaluation of their impacts are expected to yield lessons of general interest to
policy makers in Pakistan and elsewhert.  The following  sections present an empirical examination
of this issue.
m.  The  Model  Structure
The general structure of our model is a two period general equilibrium system. All agents
have perfect foresight, and hence in period 1 correctly anticipate the prices of period 2.  We need
to specify  the behavior of production, consumption, and govemment production, taxation, and deficit
financing.  We need  also specify the exchange rate  regime and  the characteristics of the  trade
account.  A  soiution is found for both  periods simultanecusly, so that  we will be  determining
outcomes for thoqe two years, and henc-I corresponding rates of change.  Our first goal will be to
4show that our model specification and estimation yields reasonably accurate replication of Pakistani
reality. Let us now turn to a brief description of the structure of the macro model.
1.  Production
An input-output matrix is used to determ.  e intermediate and final production. Because the
model incorporates perfect foresight in both production and consumption,  this matrix may  be thought
of as being replicated in each of two years. Corresponding to each sector in the input-output matrix,
value added is produced using capital, land, urban labor, and rural labor.  The technology that
produces this value added is sector-specific,  so that, for example, agriculture would have a higher
relative share of land in value added than would textiles. Thc model uses a seven sector input-output
disaggregation  of Pakistan's economy with the following  structure.
Table 1. Aegregate Input-Output Sectors
Aggegate  Sect  .r  Corresponding Dissaggregated Sectors
1.  Agriculture  1-11
2.  Mining  12
3.  Food production  13-24
4.  Textiles  25-31
5.  Other manufacturing  32-66
6.  Services  and government  67-87
7.  Imports
Here we treat imports as a single product that is distinct from domestic production. 2 The
sectoral inputs of real value added are taken from Ahmad et al. (1985), Table 1, column 2.  In order
to estimate the coefficients  in sector-specific  Cobb-Douglas  production functions for value added, we
have used data from Pakistan. Sixth Plan Progress and Future Prospects (1987).  Table V.3 gives
elasticities  of sectoral output with respect to labor inputs for a group of sectors broadly similar to the
5aggregation given in Table  . The elasticities  are representative of the period 1979-85. Since shares
must sum to  1.0,  we immediately  can obtain the share of labor in each sector.  Finally,  each sector
pays profit taxes as well as withholding taxes on inp,;  ts of labor, corresponding to income taxes.
We suppose that there is  sector-specific  capital, which is produced via investment technologies
that  use  inputs of sectoral  capital and  non sector-specific labor to  produce new capital.  The
investment in each industry is carried out by the private sector, and since the capital that is produced
in one period becomes available only in the next period, the investment firm must pay for the input
cost of its production in the current period, but will  receive the revenue from that capital in the next
period.  We will assume that investment is entirely debt financed, so that the investor sells bonds to
pay his factors of production.  Accordingly,  the investor equates the cost of borrowing given tby  the
interest rate, with the anticipated future returns on capital.
Suppose,  then, that the rental price of capital in sector j in period i +  1 is P  KJO  + 1).If  CH 11 is
the cost-minimizing  cost of producing the quantity of capital, Hj,,  then future debt obligations -
be equal to the rmturn  on new capital.  Hence, in the absence of any taxes we would have:
CHP  =  PKJ(i  )  )HJI  /(1 + r1)  (1)
where r, is the interest rate in period i, given by:
r, =  I/PBi  (2)
where Psi is the price of a bond in period i.
The investor is affected by several fiscal parameters in making his decision.  He receives an
investment tax credit as well as a depreciation allowance. He also pays a capital, or profit tax, on the
returns to his investment. Let us define the following  notation.
k.  =  Investment tax credit in sector j in period i (percent).
6dji= Depreciation allowance in sector j in period i (percent). 3
tkji= Profit (capital) tax rate in sector j (percent)
%j;=  The cost of producing the quantity HJ;  of capital in sector j.
r.=  The interest rate in period i.
Pkji= The return to capital in sector j in period i.
PM'=  The price of money in period i.
Suppose, then, that  the rental price of capital in period i+1  is Pr,, 1 . If CH is the cost-
mniiimizing  cost of producing the quantity of capital, H,, then future debt obligations must be equal
to the return  )n new capital.  Hence:
1 - tkj(i  +  1) Pk,J  + l)  HJ +  I
,j(l - kji  - dj;) =
1 +  r,
where r, is the interest rate in period i, given '
r, =  I/P.
where PB is the price of ti bond in period ;. 4
Hence the level of private investment depends on both  the current interest  rate and the
perfectly anticipated future return on capital.  As we shall see, the government finances its budget
deficit by the sale of bonds, as we: .as monetization and foreign borrowing. Government and private
bonds are viewed as being identical. Thus government policies that affect the supply of bonds, such
as reductions in spending, will have an immediate impact on interest rates and hence on private
investment.
7Given the available data, we were not able to directly estimate the shares of capital and labor
in investment. Accordingly,  we have used the shares of iapital and labor in Pakistani GDP as proxies
for their shares in investment. 5 We also neeC the elasticities of investment with respect to the
interest rate and with respect to public investment. For these figures we have used a recent paper
(Burney 1988)6,  in which aggregate and sectorai investment is estimated as a function Lf, among  other
things, change in GDP, public investment, and the real and nominal interest rates.  We are thus
implicitly assuming that  governmental development spending has an  impact on  private  capital
formation.
All sectors  in  the  economy pay both  income and  profit taxes, while certain sectors, in
particular agriculture, may receive. rbsidies. Along with its spending on subsidies,  transfer payments,
and interest obligations, to be discussed  shortly, the government produres public goods using capital
of the manufacturing sector and labor as inputs to production.  These goods ai - divided between
those used for development, represented by capital expenditures, and those which are represented
by current expenditure, and which have no direct impact on private output. 7 The government's target
for the output of public goods is determined exogenously  in each time period in terms of constant
rupees.  An attempt to model an optimizing government is thus not made.
2.  Consumption
There are two types of consumers, representing rural and urban labor. We suppose that both
consumer classes have the same demand patterns for goods, and that their demands for the seven
different types of goods are given by constant fractions of their incomes. 8 In order to estimate these
parameters we have again relied upon Ahrr  et al. (1985). Table 2 in Ahmad gives sectoral gross
outputs and that portion of gross output that goes to intermediate production. By taking differences
we may obtain an estimate of sales to final demand. 9
8The consumers maximize  intectemporal utility functions, which have as arguments the levels
of con,sumption  and leisure in each of the two periods. We permit rural-urban migration  in that rural
workers can choose to become urban labor if the relative wage is favorable. The consumers maximize
these utility functions subje-t to intertemporal budget constraints.  The consumer saves by holding
money,  domestic, bonds, and possibly  foreign currency. He requires money for transactions purposes,
but his demand for money is sensitive to changes in the interest rate.  The consumer receives income
from his labor, from the rental or  any capital or land that he owns, and from the interest payments
on bonds that he has purchased. He may also receive direct transfer payments from the government.
HIe  pays sales taxes on the goods he cor.sumes,  as well  as tariffs on imported goods. The con  mer's
bond holdings are also subject to a capital loss if the domestic interest rate falls. His maximiz ..on
problem is thus:
max U(x)  x = (x 1,L,x 2,LT2)  (3)
such that:
(I  + t,)Px,  + PLxu + PMxMY  + PBjxBi  + eiP 8FXBf  (3a)
= PR(1 - 6)'K + PUL + PMixM(i.1)  +  r(I. )xB(i.l)  + PBjXB(I.I +  eiPBFXBF(I  1)  + TRi
log PMpm  = a + b !og  (1 + t,)Px - c log r,  (3b)
'og PBxBj  - log e,PB,3xBpi a  +  B(log r, - log eir,)  (3c)
where:
PI - price vector of consumption goods in period i.
x, = vector of consumption in period i.
t, =  vector of sales tax rates in period i.
Pu = price of leisure in period i.
L =  initial holding of labor/leisure.
9P=  price of capital in period i.
K =  initial holding of capital.
6  =  rate of depreciation of capital.
x=  const  iptiun of leisure in period i.
P=  price of money in period i.  Money in period 1 is the numeraire and hence has a price of 1.
A decline in the relative price of money from one period to the next represents inflation.
xm =  holdings of money in period i.
PB,  = discount price of a domestic tond  in period i.
r,=  domestic interest rate in period i.
x., =quantity  of domestic bonds purchased in period i.
e=  the exchange rate in terms of units of domestic currency per unit of foreign currency in period
I.
BFI=  foreign currency discount price of foreign bonds in period i.
x=  quantity of foreign bonds purchased in period i.
TR 1 =  transfer payments from the government in period i.
a, b, c, a,  B = estimated constants.
Thus the left hand side of equation (3a) represents the value of consumption of goods and
leisure, as well as of financial assets.  The right hand side contains the value of the consumer's
holdings of capital and labor, as well as the principal values and interest that he receives from the
domestic and foreign financial  assets that he held at the end of the previous period. Thus his budget
constraint is affected by both interest arid  exchange rates. Equation (3b) is a standard money demand
equation in which the demand for cash balances depends upon the domestic interest rate and the
value of intended consumption. Finally, equation (3c) says that the proportion of savings made up
of domestic and foreign interest bearing assets depends upon relative domestic and foreign interest
10rates, deflated by the exchan;e rate.  If no holding  of foreign  assets is permitted,  then savings  is
entirely  made up of domestic  bonds.
The key behavioral  equation  we need to estimate for the domestic  consumers  is an interest
sensitive  money  demand  equation. The consumer,  according  to our formuiation,  has a demand  for
money  represented  by a functional  form,  uniform  across  all  consumers,  in which  demand  for nominal
cash balances  depends  on the value of current consumption  and the nominal  interest rate.  This
demand  may thus be interpreted as a cash-in-advance  constraint  in which  the v"locity  of money  is
interest-sensitive.  An increase  in the nominal  interest rate then lowers  the demand for money,
tending  to raise the rate of inflation.
Accordingly,  we estimated  a money  demand  specification  which  is consistent  with  our macro
model, and used various money  definitions  for the dependent variable. Equation (4) gives  the
estimated  form of the equation:
log  M/P = ao + a,log GDP + a2log r + a3log  M/P. 1 (4)
lJere  we make the following  definitions:
M =  Money  stock (we  will  use various  definitions)
P =  Wholesale  price index
GDP = Real GDP
r = interest rate
We assume  an instantaneous  adjustment  of the money  supply  to the desired  level,  since  this
corresponds  to our macro  model. Using  M 2, broad money,  as the dependent  variable,  we estimated
the equation  over the period 1961-87  using  annual  data with the following  results:
log M/P =  - 0.051 +  0.385 log GDP -0.080 log r + 0.733 log MMP.,  (5)
(-0.05)  (2.71)  (-1.31)  (6.02)
11R2 = .96  H =0.94
The numbers in parenthesis are t-statistics. It is useful to derive the long run form of the estimated
equation, when the real money stock is constant.  Setting M/P=M/P., we obtain:
log M/P =  -0.191 +  1.442 log GDP  - 0.30 log r  (6)
Hence the long run elasticity of real cash balances with respect to real income is 1.442, and with
respect to interest rate changes it is -0.30. The greater than 1.0 elasticity  with respect to real income
probably reflects the steadily increasing monetization of the economy.
We also carried out  a similar estimation using the rate of inflation, jr, as an explanatory
variable, since it may be claimed that the interest rate is not market determined in Pakistan and
hence does not reflect the true opportunity cost of holding money." 0 The resulting equation estimate
is:
log M/P  =  - 0.109  + 0.195 log GDP  - 1.049 X  + 0.882 log M/P.,  (7)
(0.11)  (1.55)  (4.08)  (8.44)
R 2 = 0.97  H-test  =  0.81
We thus notice that inflation is highly  significant  in this equation, although GDP no longer is.
Finally, it may be useful to report the outcomes of carrying  out the money demand estimates
using Ml, currency plus demand deposits, rather than M2, as the dependent variable. The outcome
using the interest rate as the explanatory variable was:
log M/P = 0.032 + 0.455 log GDP - 0.098 log r +  0.650 log M/P.,  (8)
(0.10)  (3.15)  (-1.66)  (4.59)
=  0.95  H-test  =  1.02
12We thus obtain the long run form of the estimated equation as:
log M/P = 0.91 +  1.297 log GDP - 0.280 log r  (9)
which is broadly similar to the outcome arrived at with M2 as the dependent variable.
The consumer saves  by purchasing  domestic bonds, in addition to holding  money. He receives
the interest payments on these bonds, as well as possible capital gains. As indicated in equation (3)
we also allow for the  possibility of consumer's holding foreign assets by formulating a  portfolio
balance model in which consumers divide their savings between domestic and foreign assets on the
basis of relative interest rates deflated by the expected rate of change of the domestic currency
relative to the foreign currency. There is an elasticity of substitution between domestic and foreign
assets, so that we do not necessarily  obtain factor price equalization. If it is forbidden to hold foreign
currency, then we could impose the condition that the share of foreign assets in the portfolio is set
to zero.  Since the consumer is thus sensitive to both interest rates as well as the exchange rate,
government policies that affect either of these will have an immediate impact on the consumer.
The consumer pays market prices plus sales taxes for all goods except agriculture, which may,
for some consumers, be subsidized. In addition, he pays  personal income taxes,  while profit taxes are
paid at the enterprise level. The total value of the consumer's consumption in each period must be
equal to his corresponding income, so that we do not permit personal borrowing,  a simplification  that
seems reasonable for Pakistan. In the final period of the model we impose an exogenous savings  rate
on the consumers." Thus savings rates are endogenously  determined by intertemporal maximization
in period 1, but are fLxed  in period 2.
133.  Fnancing the Central Government
The government  collects  income,  profit, and sales taxes,  as well as import  duties, and pays
subsidies.  In addition,  the government  must  cover both domestic  and foreign  interest obligations  on
public  debt  The deficit  of the central government  in period 1, DI, is then given  by:
DI = GI + SI +  rB.  + eIrI 1 BFO-  T 1 (10)
where S1  represents  subsidies  given  in period 1,  Gjis  spending  on goods  and services,  while  the other
two terms reflect domestic  and foreign  interest obligations  of the government,  based on its initial
stocks  of debt. Thus, for example,  policies  that cause  the exchange  rate to depreciate  will  increase
foreign  interest payments. T, represents  total revenues  of the government.
The resulting  deficit  is financed  by a combination  of monetization  and domestic  and foreign
borrowing.  Then if yBOI  represents  the face  value  of domestic  bonds  sold  by the government  in period
1, and Cp represents  its foreign  borrowing,  then its budget  deficit  in period 2 is given  by:
D2  =  G2 +  S2 + r2(yBOI  + Bo)  + e-2rp(Cp  + BFO)  - Ts  (11)
where r2(y 501+Bo)  represents  the interest obligations  on outstanding  debt plus domestic  borrowing
from period 1, and e2rp2(CR+Bo)  is the interest payment  on foreign  debt plus period 1 foreign
bofrowing.
The intuition  behind  the determination  of the interest rate should  now  be apparent. There
are two sources  of domestic  bond creation, private investors  financing  capital formation,  and the
government  financing  budget deficits. Consumers  demand  bonds for savings  and increases  in real
interest rates tend to induce  them to save  more. At the same  time,  increases  in interest  rates cause
14consumers to  reduce  their  money holdings, driving up  the  rate  of  inflation.  Accordingly, the
combination of  all these  factors, along with expectations of  the  future  price of  consumption,
determine an equilibrium price of bonds and hence an interest rate.
4.  The Foreign Sector
The foreign sector is represented by a simple export equation in which aggregate demand for
exports is determined by domestic and foreign price indices, as well as world income.  Hence the
foreign currency value of exports is sensitive to changes in the exchange rate as well as to domestic
price changes.  The  combination of  the export equation  and  domestic supply responses then
determines aggregate exports.  Foreign lending has not been modelled, but has been taken to be
exogenous.  Thus  gross  capital  inflows are  exogenous, but  the  overall change  in  reserves  is
endogenous, depending upon savings  behavior and demand for imports of consumers." 2
Using annual data over the period 1970-87  we estimated the following  export equation:
log X =  - 14.027  - 0.095  log XP + 0.708 log XPW + 2.639 log GDPW  (12)
(-6.17) (-0.23)  (1.46)  (3.86)
k2  =  0.96  D.W. =  1.34
Here we have made the following  definitions.
X = US$ value of Pakistani exports
XP = Price index of Pakistani exports in terms of US$
XPW = Price index of world exports in terms of US$
GDPW = Index of world income in terms of US$
15We thus see that all coefficients have the correct anticipated sign, if we interpret equation
(12) as a demand equation.  World income is highly  significant  in explaining  Pakistani exports. When
we included Pakistani income as an explanatory variable, it was found to not be significant and to
cause the overall explanatory power of the export equation to deteriorate.  Although many other
functional forms could be estimated to explain exports, equation (12) is especially  useful since it has
the correct specification to be incorporated in our macro model.  It appears that the world export
price index has greater explanatory power in determining Pakistani exports than does the Pakistani
export price index. This may simply  reflect the fact that Pakistan is a small country.
IV.  A Benchmark Simulation for Pakistan
In order to use our model for counter-factual simulations,  it is first necessary to see how well
it replicates historical  outcomes. Accordingly,  we have incorporated the various estimated parameters
described above and have then run the macroeconomic model for the years 1986-87  to  1987-88,
taking 1985-86  as the base year.  By this we mean that initial allocations of capital, land, urban and
rural labor, money,  domestic bonds, and foreign reserves are given by their stocks at the end of 1985-
86.
We then take tax rates to have their estimated effective values.  Government current and
capital expenditures are given their actual values for 1986-7  and 1987-88. We also suppose that the
Central Bank wishes to maintain a level el reserves equal to two months of the level of imports in
1985-86. Clearly this is an arbitrary rule, and in practice, Pakistani Central Bank reserves have been
much lower in recent years.  However the rule corresponds to a standard policy prescription.  The
Central Bank does not maintain a pure float to achieve this goal.  Rather, referring to Diagram 1,
if the level of resenmes  falls below its target level the slope of the Central Bank's devaluation is set
equal to -2.0. If the level of reserves rises above the target level, then the Bank revalues with a slope
16of -0.5.  Clearly these numbers are also arbitrary, but, as we shall see, they yield exchange rate
changes that closely approximate actual changes. Since the Central Bank of Pakistan was actually
intervening in the exchange market during this period more actively than our model specifies, we
should not  expect that our overall results are an exact replication of reality.  Finally, given the
estimated behavioral parameters, we solve for an equilibrium for the two year period in question.
For  our  benchmark  simulation we  take  investment tax  credits  to  be  15 percent  for
manufacturing activities in various sectors of the economy. Table 2 reports the simulation outcomes
of macroeconomic  variables, with actual historical values in parenthesis.  It may be worth making a
few remarks concerning the simulated and actual values. First notice that our model generates rates
of growth in real GDP that is fairly close to the historical values. Government revenues are higher
than their actual historical levels, possibly because we have exaggerated the coverage of the tax
system.  At  the same time, government expenditure levels are higher than the historical pattern,
possibly  because we attributed a higher level of debt service to the public sector than actually  occurs.
The overall budget deficit is, nonetheless, approximately equal to the actual deficit in both years.
Export behavior is closely in line with reality, while we tend to underestimate imports, probably
because our estimated import elasticities  do not fully reflect the pent-up demand for imports, both
for final consumption and for intermediate inputs, in Pakistan. Inflation is in line with the actual rate
of change in the wholesale price index,  while  interest rates are somewhat  higher than actual long term
rates.  This discrepancy may stem from the fact that there are restrictions on interest rates that are
reflected in the historical  data, thereby making  them lower than if they were truly market determined.
Finally,  the simulated exchange rate generates a slight appreciation, rather than the depreciation that
actually  was realized. This is primarily  the result of our simulated real interest rate being higher than
the actual real rate.
17Table 2:  Base Simulation  with  Historical Government
Fiscal Parameters (15 percent Investment Tax Credits  a/
1986-87  1987-88
Nominal GDP b/  608.1  (6;3.  )  677.2  (685.9)
Real GDP c/  89.6  (89.6)  92.8  (94.4)
Govemment spending h/d/  190.2  (152.4)  231.2  (179.9)
Revenues g/  144.7  (103.9)  170.2  (118.6)
Government budget deficit g/  -45.5  (-48.5)  -61.0  (-61.3)
Private investment gle/  45.6  (38.2)  46.2  (42.8)
Exports g/  83.2  (81.2)  93.4  (97.5)
Imports g/  99.5  (120.5)  116.7  (138.3)
Trade balance g/  -16.3  (-39.3)  -23.3  (-40.8)
Infiation rate fl  5.0  (5.0)  7.5  (10.2)
Interest rate d/  15.3  (15.3)  24.9  (13.5)
Exchange rate C/  17.4  (17.4)  16.3  (18.0)
Net Real Capital  Real  Tax Revenue h/
Formation: 1986-88  Output  Paid
(1)  (2)  (1)  (2)
Other manufacturing  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0
Textiles  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0
Mining  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0
Food production  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0
Services and  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0
government
Urban Consumer  Rural Consumer i/
Welfare index  100.0  100.0
a/ The numbers in parenthesis are actual historical values.
b/ In billions  of Rupees at market prices. The model has been normalized  so that simulated nominal
and real GDP are equal to historical values in 1986-87.
c/ In billions of constant 1959-60  Rupees.
d/ Interest rate on long term (five year and over) bank deposits.
e/There is a problem in our simulations  of distinguishing  between private investment and government
capital expenditures.  Accordingly,  we tend to underestimate governmrnt capital expenditures and
overestimate private investment. The sum of the two is approximately correct, however.
f/ Inflation rates are normalized so as to have their historical  values in the initial year. We are using
the rate of inflation in the wholesale price index.
g/ In billions of Rupees.
h/ All three of these columns are index numbers which we will use to make comparisons when we
calculate the effects of introducing investment and employment tax credits. The numbers (1) and (2)
refer to 1986-87 and 1987-88,  respectively.
i/ We calculate utility levels in each simulation and use the levels of this simulation  as a benchmark.
18V.  Tax Policy Simalations
It therefore seems reasonable to use our model to carry out counter-factual simulations. Our
first exercise will be to examine the implications of raising the investment tax credit rate from 15 to
30 percent.  Although this doubling is arbitrary, it should give some notion of the effectiveness of
increasing tax credits.  The resulting outcomes are given in Table 3.
We thus observe that aggregate real investment has risen by 11.7 percent in 1986-87  and by
25.7 percent in 1987-88  at the same time the real interest rate has declined from 9.8 per cent to 0.6
percent in 1986-87,  while in 1987-88  it rose from 16.2 percent to 23.7 percent.  Accordingly,  if we
compound the real interest rates over the two years of the simulation,  we see that there has been an
aggregate decline of 2.5 percent in the real interest rate.  Thus, the overall decline in real interest
rates, combined with the doubling of the investment tax credit, has brought about the large inc.:tase
in real investment.
We thus notice that the use of increased investment tax credits caused a loss of approximately
1.3 percent of real GDP in the second year, as compared with the simulation reported in Table 2.
This decline has taken place despite the fact that, in Table 3, private investment has risen and, in
addition, the fact that real government spending fell by 0.6 percent in 1986-87  and rose by 4.9 percent
in 1987-88,  leading to an aggregte real increase of 4.3 percent, as compared to Table 2. Much of this
increase comes, however, from the cost of the investment subsidy. Sectoral real production has, at
the same time, uniformly declined in both periods, as compared with Table 2, as factors have been
shifted out  of current production into investment.  As might then be expected, there have been
corresponding losses in aggregate welfare for both consumers.'
The government budget deficit has remained at 7.5 percent of GDP in both simulations in
1986-87,  while in 1987-88  it has risen from 9.0 to 10.5 percent of GDP in Table 3. Thus the increase
in the investment tax credit does eventually cause an increase in real budget deficit, although this
19Table 3:  Simulation  with I,nvestment  Tax Credits
Set at 30 percent  a/
1986-87  1987-88
Nominal GDP b/  686.4  763.7
Real GDP c/  89.1  91.6
Government spending h/d/  214.6  277.3
Revenues g/  163.3  197.4
Govemment budget deficit g/  -51.3  -79.9
Private investment g/e/  57.8  76.7
Exports g/  90.6  101.7
Imports g/  109.8  132.5
Trade balance g/  -19.2  -30.8
Inflation rate f/  19.2  8.2
Interest rate d/  19.9  33.8
Exchange rate f/  19.0  20.0
Net Real Capital  Real  Tax Revenue h/
Formation: 1986-88  Output  Paid
(1)  (2)  (1)  (2)
Other manufacturing  133.3  97.1  95.4  97.2  97.0
Textiles  127.3  97.0  95.4  100.9  103.4
Mining  116.9  96.6  94.8  101.4  96.9
Food production  101.0  97.6  9'.9  84.3  83.1
Services and  122.5  96.9  95.1  101.6  104.5
government
Urban Consumer  Rural Consumer U
Welfare index  98.7  84.7
a/ The numbers in parenthesis are actual historical  values.
b/ In billions of Rupees at market prices. The model has been normalized  so that simulated nominal
and real GDP are equal to historical values in 1986-87.
c/ In billions of constant 1959-60  Rupees.
d/ Interest rate on long term (five year and over) bank deposits.
e/There is a problem in our simulations  of distinguishing  between private investment  and government
capital expenditures.  Accordingly,  we tend to underestimate government capital expenditures and
overestimate private investment. The sum of the two is approximately  correct, however.
f/ Inflation rates are normalized so as to have their historical  values in the initial year. We are using
the rate of inflation in the wholesale price index.
g/ In billions of Rupees.
h/ These are index numbers which we will use to make comparisons when we calculate the effects
of introducing investment and employment tax credits. The numbers (1) and (2) refer to 1986-87  and
1987-88,  respectively.
i/ We calculate utility levels in each simulation and use the levels of this simulation as a benchmark.
20increase does not necessarily seem to be unsustainably  high.  It is interesting to note that total real
tax revenues are slightly lower in period I and higher in period 2 in this ce-se  than in the previous
case, although tax changes are uneven across sectors.  This is due to the fact that the in. estment tax
credits have brought about increases in capital stocks, thereby increasing primary tax revenues in the
second period, when the new capital is on  line.  In the first period, however, capital has been
transferred from current to capital proc.iction, in response to the increased investment tax credits,
thereby reducing revenues.  The inflation and interest rates have increased, and the balance of
payments has deteriorated  in both periods, as compared to Table 2.  Thus, although the goal of
increasing the rate of capital formation has been achieved, the macroeconomic  consequences u,f  the
investment tax credit increase do not seem favorable.
Let us now suppose that the government attempts to avoid the adverse consequence of the
investment tax credit  increase yet still achieve some  increase in  the rate  of  capital formation.
Accordingly, it uses an alternative approach in which there  is a  reduction in the rate of capital
taxation. As an example, we will suppose that the statuatory corporate tax rate is reduced from 55
percent to 30 percent in the second year of the simulation. The resulting simulation results are given
in Table 4.
We thus observe that the use of the reduced corporate profit tax in period 2 has caused there
to be a welfare improvement over both the base simulation, as well as the simulation with increased
investment tax credits. There has been a somewhat reduced rate of capital formation, as compared
with the case of increased investment tax credits, although investment is still higher than in the base
case.  The one apparent drawback with the reduced capital tax rate is that it has brought about a
sharply increased budget deficit in the second period, primarily  because the tax reduction applies to
all segments of the economy.
21Table 4:  Simulation  with Corporate Tax Rate
Reduced to 30 percent in,  Second Period  a/
1986-87  1987-88
Nominal GDP b/  635.1  736.3
Real GDP c/  89.1  103.4
Government spending h/d/  194.7  244.2
Revenues g/  152.1  127.3
Government budget deficit g/  -42.6  -116.9
Private investment glel  47.6  47.2
Exportsg/  86g7  990
Imports g/  104.3  127.7
Trade balance g/  -17.3  -28.7
Inflation rate f/  10.3  -0.1
Interest rate d/  19.5  34.9
Exchange rate f/  18.1  20.9
Net Real Capital  Real  Tax Revenue h/
Formation: 1986-88  Output  Paid
(1)  (2)  (1)  (2)
Other manufacturing  138.8  99.7  102.6  101.0  64.4
Textiles  108.0  99.7  101.8  100.4  61.3
Mining  96.4  99.8  104.4  99.1  59.5
Food production  134.9  99.7  102.5  106.7  68.1
Services and  106.8  99.8  103.7  100.5  62.5
govemment
Urban Consumer  Rural Consumer i/
Welfare index  101.5  103.3
a/ The numbers in parenthesis are actual historical values.
b/ In billions  of Rupees at market prices. The model has been normalized so that simulated nominal
and real GDP are equal to historical values in 1986-87.
c/ In billions of constant 1959-60  Rupees.
d/ Interest rate on long term (five year and over) bank deposits.
e/ There is a problem in our simulations  of distinguishing  between private investment and government
capital expenditures.  Accordingly,  we tend to underestimate government capital expenditures and
overestimate private investment. The sum of the two is approximately correct, however.
f/ Inflation rates are normalized so as to have their historical  values in the initial year. We are using
the rate of inflation in the wholesale price index.
g/ In billions of Rupees.
h/ These are index numbers which we will use to make comparisons when we calculate the effects
of introducing investment and employment tax credits. The numbers (1) and (2) refer to 1986-87  and
1987-88,  respectively.
i/ We calculate utility levels in each simulation and use the levels of this simulation as a benchmark.
22We may  thus conclude  that, at least in the case  of Pakistan,  a reduction  in the capital  income
tax rate is  superior  to an increase  in investment  tax  credits  as an instrument  for improving  investment
performance.
VI. Conclusion and Policy Implications
We have  constructed  a simple  model  designed  to address  the issue  of investment  tax  credits
in Pakistan.  The general structure  of our model is a two period getneral  equilibrium  system. All
agents have perfect foresight,  and hence in period 1 correctly  anticipate  the prices  of period 2.  A
solution  is found  for both periods  simultaneously,  so that we  determine  outcomes  for those  two  years,
and hence  corresponding  rates  of change. We first  show  that our mcdel  specification  and estimation
yields reasonably  accurate replication  of Pakistani  reality. We then use the estimated  model to
address  two alternative  scenarios.
In the first  of these scenarios  we attempt to estimate the effect  of increasing  the investment
tax credit  rate from 15 percent to 30 percent. We observe  that the new  fiscal  regime  causes,  among
other things,  a welfare  deterioration,  while  leading  to a significant  increase  in inflation  rates. In the
second simulation,  we retain the original  investment  tax credit rates but reduce the statuatory
corporate  tax rates. The new  results  are welfare  improving  as compared  to both the original  scenario
as well  as the example  with increased  investment  tax credits.
We thus  conclude  that, at least  in the case  of Pakistan,  that changes  in the corporate  tax  rates
seem be superior  to increased  investment  tax  credits  as instruments  for promoting  capital  formation.
In particular,  cuts in corporate  taxes  produce  outcomes  that are welfare  superior  to those  that occur
with an investment  tax increase. The increases  in capital formation that are stimulated  by the
increased  investment  tax  credits  are greater than those  brought  about  by decreased  corporate  taxes,
but the tax credits  also have  significant  negative  macroeconomic  consequences.
23ENDNOTES
1.  The dissaggregated sectors are those given in Ahmad, Barrett and Coady (1985), in which an
87 sector matrix is derived to represent Pakistan's technology for 19i81. The aggregation is
carried out by simply adding corresponding rows and columns.
2.  This treatment is commonly known as the Armington assumption in the literature.  In order to
derive input-output coefficients for imports as intermediate inputs to production we have used
sectoral flows  given in Ahmad et al. (19°85),  Table 27b, column 3, and have aggregated  according
to the sectoral pattern given in Table 1.
3.  This may be interpreted as an accelerated depreciation allowance,  since the firm is permitted
to take the allowance in the current period, although the capital does not come on line until the
next period.
4.  This formulation of the investment tax credit is adapted form Auerbach and Hines (1988).
5.  Errors associated with these proxies are not known.
6.  See  "Relationship  Between  Economic Growth  and  Investment  in  Pakistan;  A  Study in
Incremental Capital Output Ratio," by Nadeem A. Burney, unpublished paper, Pakistan Institute
of Development Economics, (August, 1988). The numbers we use are taken from Table 10,
(Aggregate Private Investment Function with Instantaneous Adjustment).
7.  Current spending may, via its impact on wages, the availability  of capital, and the interest rate
indirectly have very considerable impact upon private output.
8.  The assumption  of equal relative spending on different goods by both urban and rural consumers
is probably  inaccurate. There is, however,  insufficient  data, for us to esti,nate individual  demand
functions.
9.  The  flaw in this approach is that it does not  separate  final demand into  private demand,
government demand, and exports.  We lack sufficient data  to construct such a  breakdown,
however, at the level of disaggregation  we wish,  so we have had to use total final demand as a
proxy for private demand.
10.  We tried several variations of this formulation. In one we used an adaptive expectations scheme
to  derive an  expected rate  of  inflation.  Using the current  rate  of  inflation is of  course
equivalent assuming instantaneous adjustment  of expectations. We also used a perfect foresight
formulation in which the expected rate of inflation is equal to next period's actual rate of
inflation.  The use of actual inflation rates turned out to  be superior  to  any of the other
methodologies.
11.  The exogenous savings  rate is imposed in order that consumers have a demand for bonds in the
final period.  Otherwise all outstanding debt would have to be paid off and, in particular, the
entire stock of public debt would have to be liquidated.
2412.  Import demand is derived from the consumer optimization problem and hence depends upon
relative foreign and domestic prices as well as disposable income. Hence consumer demand for
imports implicitly  reflects an estimated import price elasticity as well as an income elasticity.
13.  The full employment model used here incorporates a labor supply function. Thus labor may not
be  fully employed although capital is always fully employed.  The treatment of involuntary
unemployment remains problematic ii  these models.
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